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Thoughts on Crawford 
The Crawford Transformation 
by Richard D. Friedman 
Michigan Law School 
Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct 
1354 (2004), is one of the most dramatic 
Evidence cases in recent history, radically 
transforming the doctrine governing 
Con frontation Clause the Sixth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution . 
Crawford is a very positive development, 
but leaves many open questions B and 
forces Evidence to rethink 
they teach hearsay confrontation. 
The Transformation 
tran.sformation 
wrought may be grasped by 
contrasting it in three respects with the 
previously prevailing framework, which 
was laid out in U 
56 (1980), later cases. 
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First, Crawford makes clear that the 
principa!Cand perhaps onlycfocus of the 
Confrontation Clause is testimonial 
statements. In contrast, under Roberts any 
hearsay statement by an out-of-court 
declarant posed a potential confrontation 
issue B though often the issue was resolved 
in favor of the prosecution. Crawford=s 
focus on testimonial statements is in accord 
with the text of Confrontation Clause, 
which provides A[i]n criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.@ The most natural meaning of 
Awitnesses@ is who give testimony. 
focus on testimonial statements is also in 
accord with the basic idea that motivated the 
clause, one that is still crucial to the Anglo­
American system: that, in contrast to the 
procedures of some systems of medieval 
Europe, prosecution witnesses should give 
their testimony in the presence of the 
accused and be subject to oral cross­
ex aminati on. 
Second, a statement is testiwonial 
and offered against an accused to prove the 
truth of what it asserts, it cannot be admitted 
unless the accused has an opportunity to 
cross-examme maker of the statement . 
Under hearsay usually be 
admitted against an accused if it was 
deemed reliable, reliability 
found if the statement fit within a firmly 
rooted hears1y exception or if it was deemed 
to guarantees 
trustworthiness. The reliability test was 
extraordinarily malleable, and now it is no 
more; if a statement is testimonial, Crawford 
establishes a requirement cross­
examination. 
Third, the opportunity 
cross-examination ordinarily should occur at 




examination taken at an earlier proceeding 
as an acceptable second-best substitute. 
Under Roberts, unavailability had an 
uncertain role that was difficult to defend. 
Unchanged Matte:rs 
There are numerous aspects of 
confrontation law that remain unchanged by 
Crawford. It is still true that a matter does 
not raise a confrontation issue unless it is 
offered to prove the truth of what it asserts; 
that if a witness is subjected to cross­
examination at trial, introduction of her prior 
statements will not be deemed to create a 
confrontation problem, even if the prior 
statements contain substance not included in 
the current testimony; that if the accused=s 
own wrongdoing caused the witness=s 
unavailability the accused will be deemed to 
have forfeited the confrontation right; and 
that in some circumstances a violation of the 
Confrontation Clause may be deemed 
harmless and therefore not require reversal. 
The doctrine governing when a witness 
should be deemed unavailable is probably 
untouched by Crmvford. So too, at least 
the moment, is the rule of Maryland v. 
Craig, 497 U.S. 836 990), providing that 
if a child witness would be traumatized by 
having to testify in the presence of the 
accused, the child may testify in another 
room with the judge and counsel present but 
the jury and the accused connected 
electronically. Beyond all this, the results in 
many cases remain the same even if 
rationale changes substantially: Many 
statements that were deemed reliable under 
Roberts be called non-testimonial under 
Crawford, so will avoid searching 
Confrontation Clause scrutiny. 
The Meaning of ATestimonial@ 
Much change, however. The 
most critical question is: What statements 
shall be deemed testimonial? Crav;ford 
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declined to offer a comprehensive definition 
of the term. It did say that the term Aapplies 
at a minimum to prior testimony at a 
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or 
at a former trial; and to police 
interrogations.@ 124 S. Ct. at 1374. The 
Court took care to note that it used the term 
Ainterrogation@ in Aits colloquia], rather 
than any technical legal, sense,@ and that the 
statement at issue in the case, Aknowingly 
given in response to structured police 
questioning, qualifies under any conceivable 
definition,@ at 1365 n.4; at another point, 
it noted that A[i]nvolvement of government 
officers in the production of testimony with 
an eye toward trial presents unique potential 
for prosecutorial abuse.@ Id. at 1367 n.7. 
This emphasis on government involvement 
might suggest the Court will stick 
closely to its minimalist enumeration of 
types of testimonial statements. Even if it 
does so, Crawford will create a significant 
protection against some of the more blatant 
violations of the confrontation right that 
lower courts tolerated during the Roberts 
era. 
The minimalist enumeration, 
however, is too narrow. witness can 
create testimony against an accused without 
any prosecutorial involvement at all; indeed, 
the right to confront witnesses first emerged 
in systems in which there was no prosecutor 
at See Acts 25: 16. Crawford noted that 
one of the statements involved in the 
notorious Raleigh case was a letter. Id. at 
1360. .A.nd one three formulations of the 
term Atestimonial@ that the Court quoted B 
the best of the three, in my view B operates 
from the perspective of the witness 
(Astatements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that 
the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial,@ at 1364). Certainly a 
statement made to a private person who is 
used as an intermediary for transmission to 
the authorities should be regarded as 
testimonial; otherwise, a gaping opportunity 
for avoiding Crawford will be created. 
One context in which uncertainty 
over the term Atestimonial@ is being played 
out is that of what Bridget McCormack and I 
have called Adial-in testimony,@ statements 
made in 911 calls and to responding officers. 
The attempt in People v. lvf oscat, 2004 WL 
615113, 2004 N.Y. Slip 24090 (Crim . Ct. 
Bronx Co. 2004), to categorize virtually aH 
911 calls as non-testimonial is vastly 
overbroad, I believe. Davis v. State, now 
pending in the Washington Supreme Court, 
and to be argued by Jeffrey Fisher, who this 
year also won both Crawford and Blakely v. 
Washington, 2004 S. Ct. 1402697, may be a 
significant case in this area. 
Another area of great uncertainty is 
of child declarants. Are some children 
too immature, cognitively or morally or 
both, to be considered witnesses at all? If a 
witness perspective is adopted m 
determining whether a statement is 
testimonial, should its application take into 
account the developmental stage of the 
child? 
Other Issues 
Crawford raises or intensifies several 
significant questions apart from the bounds 
of the term Atestimonia1@: 
! Are dying declarations admissible 
not withstanding a lack opportunity 
cross-examination, and , so, on what basis? 
An essential aspect of is that the 
Avagaries of the rules of evidence@ do not 
affect the status a testimonial statement 
under the Confrontation Clause, at 1 
but it suggested that a sui generis exception 
on historical grounds may be made for dying 
declarations. Id. at 1367 But State v. 
867738 (Kans. 
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such a statement admissible on the 
preferable basis that the accused had 
forfeited the right of cross-examination. 
Because the Court continues 
(wrongly, I believe) to adhere to the view 
that if a witness testifies subject to cross at 
trial the Confrontation Clause poses no 
obstacle to admissions of her pnor 
statement, even if the witness no longer 
asserts the substance of the statement, there 
may wen be increased pressure to make the 
rule against hearsay inapplicable to an prior 
statements of a witness . 
! The Court left suspended 
question whether Roberts continues to apply 
to non-testimonial statements. If it does, it 
is unlikely to much impact; · a 
statement is not excluded the hearsay 
rule, a court holds it to be non­
testimonial is unlikely to hold it 
insufficiently reliable for Roberts. The 
theory of Crawford makes the Clause 
inapplicable to non-testimonial statements, 
and perhaps in time the Court will give the 
coup de grace to Roberts. 
! In what circumstances should a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination be 
deemed sufficient, so that if the witness is 
unavailable to testify at trial an earlier 
testimonial statement may be admitted? 
Pedagogy 
Finally, does affect 
way Evidence should be taught? Some 
Evidence teachers spent a great deal 
time on and then discussed 
confrontation at all. If this 
approach was ever viable, it is not after 
Crawford. In my view, we should focus on 
confrontation we teach hearsay. 
There is an historical basis for doing so: 
The confrontation right developed long 
before the rule. After 
one does not need to understand the hearsay 
rule to the confrontation right. 
Quite the reverse, in fact. If one first 
understands the basic nature of the 
confrontation right (and, except as they bear 
on the question of unavailability, there is not 
much need to discuss most of the cases from 
the Roberts era), then it becomes possible to 
examine an the complexities of hearsay law 
with questions such as these in mind: To 
what extent does the doctrine reflect the 
confrontation right, which is now 
independently protected, or a more general 
and softer principle applicable to civil cases 
as well, that statements made litigation 
use in mind ought to be made under the 
conditions prescribed for testimony, 
including the oath and opportunity for cross­
examination? To the extent that the doctrine 
does not reflect confrontation principles, 
does it advance the search for truth, or is it 
in large part a relic that should be shed? 
Crawford, in other words, can be the 
occasion for rethinking not only the 
confrontation right and how we teach it, nor 
even merely how we teach hearsay, but how 
the law of hearsay should be reconstructed. 
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